Perspectief 2019-45

2019-45 Prof. dr. Eduardo Echeverria 53 Minimally, however, faith involves belief, and to have a belief means that one is intellectu- ally committed to the whole truth that God has revealed. Furthermore, faith involves holding certain beliefs to be true, explains Thomas Aquinas, because “belief is called as- sent, and it can only be about a proposition, in which truth or falsity is found.” Moreover, the fides quae creditur is the objective content of truth that has been unpacked and devel- oped in the creeds and confessions of the Church, dogmas, doctrinal definitions, and canons. 5. Faith and Reason This brings us to a third aspect that is missing from their understanding of the contempo- rary context: raising the question regarding the reasonableness of the Christian faith. Recall that the authors make the point above that the Christian faith stands under criticism in our culture like never before. But they don’t acknowledge that this criticism pertains to faith’s rationality and truth. Unfortunately, then the authors never raise the question regarding the rationality of the Christian faith. Of course, the authors do not shy away from encour- aging reflective believers from dealing with complex questions (no. 19). Still, they never raise this issue regarding the relationship between faith and reason. This question is deeper that the question the authors raise about the relationship of faith and science (nos. 25-26) because the concept of rationality is broader than scientific rationality, particularly the rationality of the natural sciences. What is, then, the relationship between faith and reason? The authors are correct in stating, “Die zekerheid [van geloof], dat fundament, is geen gevolg van eigen overtuigingen, een sterke wil of een sluitend argument . Het is een per- soonlijk geschenk van Gods Geest.” In particular, “Gods aanwezigheid is geen slotsom van een redenering, geen uitkomst van een rekensom” (no. 16; emphasis added). Thus, cor- rectly they hold, the affirmation of God’s reality is not the conclusion of an argument. Yes, although the authors of GC do not directly draw this conclusion, I think we can argue that religious beliefs can be held rationally without support from the traditional theistic argu- ments (for example, cosmological, teleological, ontological, moral, and others) of natural theology. These arguments are not the actual source , for most believers, of their certainty of God’s existence.